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CASENOTES

Commercial Speech Suffers A First

Amendment Blow in United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co.
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court excluded economic advertising from the protection of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.' In 1976, however, the Court recognized
the public's interest in some forms of economic expression by granting
commercial speech First Amendment protection in Virginia State
2
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
The Court classifies speech as commercial if it relates solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience, or it predominantly invites a commercial transaction. 3 Since its decision in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court has attempted to
balance conflicting views over what level of protection to accord
commercial speech. 4 On one hand, is the social desire to safeguard
the "free market of ideas" 5 by extending First Amendment protection.
1.See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1942) (affirming
conviction of a commercial exhibitor who, in violation of a municipal ordinance,
distributed handbills containing commercial and political content).
2. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court stated that "[als to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."
Id. at 763.
3. Id. at 772 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
4. For a comprehensive discussion on commercial speech and the Supreme
Court see Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court & Commercial Speech: New Words
with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. The Court
abandoned the "highly paternalistic approach" toward commercial speech on the
assumption that "this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them." The
Court also noted that "[it is a matter of public interest that [private economic]
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable." Id. at 765.
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On the other, is the need to ensure the legitimate states' interest in
protecting its citizens from harmful commercial speech. 6
In 1980, the Court recognized these conflicting needs and sought
to balance them in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.7 Justice Powell formulated a four part test for
determining the constitutionality of government restrictions on commercial speech.' First, the activity spoken of must be lawful and the
information imparted about that activity must not be misleading. 9
Second, the asserted state interest promoted by the restriction must
be substantial.' 0 Third, the regulation must directly advance the
asserted state interest." Finally, the restriction must be no more
restrictive than necessary to serve the asserted state interest. 2 The
Court modified the fourth part of this test in Board of Trustees v.
Fox'3 to require a "reasonable fit" between the restriction and the
asserted state interest.' 4 This analytical framework has become the
universally accepted standard for reviewing the constitutionality of
restrictions upon commercial speech. 5

6. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978)
(upholding a ban on in-person solicitation by attorneys because the state has an
important interest in protecting the public from "fraud, undue influence, intimidation, [and] overreaching").
7. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
8. This article utilizes the terms "government" and "state" interchangeably
when referring to the test developed in Central Hudson.
9. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Moreover, the Court stated that "there
can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity." Id. at 563.
10. The Court stated that "the asserted governmental interest [must be] substantial." Id. at 566.
11. "If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted." Id.
12. The Court stated that a restriction on commercial speech will survive the
fourth element if "it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."
Id.
13. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).

14. Id. at 480. The Court modified the fourth element of the Central Hudson
test stating that "[wihat our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,-a fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable." Id. (citations omitted). This article refers to the four part test
enunciated in Central Hudson and modified by Fox as the "Central Hudson test."
15. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986) (casino advertising); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981) (plurality opinion) (billboard advertising); Oklahoma Broadcasters Ass'n v.
Crisp, 636 F. Supp. 978, 980-81 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (alcohol advertising).
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In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,16 the United States

Supreme Court utilized the Central Hudson test to review the consti-

tutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307, which categorically ban

radio and television stations licensed to nonlottery states from airing
another state's lottery ads. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit 17 held that the statutes constituted an impermissible
restriction on commercial speech. The United States Supreme Court

reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision on June 25, 1993.18
This article examines the United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.

decision. Part I of this article explores the development of lotteries in

the United States and then presents the development and subsequent
application of the Central Hudson test during the 1993 Term of the
United States Supreme Court. Part II discusses the lower *courts' and

Supreme Court's application of the CentralHudson test to 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1304 and 1307, as applied to Edge Broadcasting Company. Part

III concludes that the Supreme Court relied on outdated notions that

lotteries are morally wrong, incorrectly applied the third and fourth
prongs of the Central Hudson test, as well as overlooked the significance of the two prior commercial speech decisions of the 1993 Term.

Part IV suggests some practical ramifications that this decision may
have on advertising of activities or products which can be constitutionally prohibited.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

DEVELOPMENT OF LOTTERIES IN AMERICA

It is no secret that lotteries permeate every facet of our society.

According to one commentator, "the largest and fastest growing
segment of the entertainment industry is legal gambling."'

19

Histori-

16. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
17. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992) (amending
the previous unpublished per curium opinion filed Feb. 27, 1992 to be published).
18. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
19. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law- Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 93, 93 (1992).
In terms of sales, legal gambling dwarfs every other form of entertainment.
For example, in 1992, Americans spent $4.9 billion at movie theater box
offices. By comparison, in 1991, the thirty-five operating state lotteries sold
$20.9 billion in tickets. Add in parimutuel betting on horses, dogs, and jai
alai; casinos and slot machines; sports bookmaking; card rooms; and charity
and Indian bingo. The total amount bet legally in this country is conservatively estimated to be $294.6 billion.
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cally, early Americans viewed legal gambling as a legitimate way to
raise revenue. From the colonial period to the 1830s lotteries flourished throughout the United States, 20 with their "proceeds [being]
used to build cities, establish universities, and even to help finance
the Revolutionary War." ' 2' However, in the mid-nineteenth century as
governments developed better forms of taxation, legal gambling in
general, and lotteries in particular, became disfavored. 22 General social
reform which included movements for temperance, peace, women's
rights, educational reform, prison reform and abolition of slavery
prompted a series of reforms in the lottery laws. 23 "Opponents offered
three fundamental objections to lotteries: as a form of gambling they

were morally corrupting; they were often operated dishonestly; and
they creat6d serious social problems, including economic distress and
24

gambling addiction."

Further, moralist opponents questioned the

disproportionate participation among minority groups and the poor,
and also pointed to fraud and corruption as a negative consequence
of legalized lotteries.

2

1

20. See generally HENRY CHAFETZ, PLAY THE DEVIL 297-308 (1960); JOHN S.
EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN AMERICA 205 (1960); NATIONAL

INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976 540 (1977) [hereinafter DEVEL-

By CHANCE A WINNER: THE HISTORY OF LOTTERIES 45
(1972); G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal
Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 927 (1978).
OPMENTS]; GEORGE SULLIVAN,

21. Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 12 (1992).

22. Id. at 32-33.
23. Id. at 32; CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE 33
(1990); EZELL, supra note 20, at 205.
24. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 23, at 37; see Rychlack, supra note 21, at
32.
25. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 23, at 33. At the forefront of the antilottery
outcry was an influential 1814 novel written by Samuel Wood, The Wonderful

Advantage of Adventuring in the Lottery, dramatizing the personal problems asso-

ciated with the lottery. Rychlack, supra note 21, at 33. The plot involved a fictitious
young man, John Brown, who decided to try his luck in a lottery despite his wife's
wishes. John's obsession with the lottery lead him to neglect his work and family,
lose his money during the drawing by betting on which numbers would be drawn
next, steal money from his employer, turn to drinking, and participate in a highway
robbery in which the victim was shot and killed. Id. John was ultimately captured,
sentenced to death, and his wife died from grief. The moral of the story stated by
the judge at the end of the trial, was that: "[lotteries] will destroy domestic happiness
and inward peace, and bring upon [individuals] every kind of distress." Id. at 34.
While this example was a bit exaggerated, the controversial moral problems presented
by lotteries were clearly illustrated.
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Corruption of the morality of United States' citizens was not the

only concern of lottery reformers. Opponents also claimed that state-

sponsored lotteries were being operated fraudulently.2 6 Several investigations of chartered lotteries and lottery operators revealed that

lottery proceeds were all too often being pocketed instead of going to

the rightful prizewinner. 27 Outrage at these abuses added momentum
among those who already opposed lotteries on moral grounds and

propelled lottery opponents to lobby the individual states and Con-

gress to outlaw lotteries.
By 1862, only two states had not enacted constitutional or
statutory prohibitions against lotteries. 2 Even in states with prohibi-

tions, two major obstacles to reform efforts were their inability to

regulate the mails through which advertisements and lottery tickets
were distributed, and to prosecute lotteries conducted legally in other
jurisdictions. 29 Because the states "would have had to attack lotteries

at the consumer level-a difficult, expensive, and unpopular task," 3°0-

they sought the help of Congress. In support of the states' efforts,
Congress enacted a series of postal regulations to assist states wishing

to control lotteries.31
Congress enacted the first significant limitation on state lottery
laws in 1868.32 The Act provided: "it shall not be lawful to deposit
in a post office, to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning
lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering
prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever."" However, the Act was
difficult to enforce because postal workers had no authority to open
mails which they suspected might violate the new statute. Moreover,

26. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 23, at 35.
27. Id. (discussing an investigation which discovered revenues intended for
public project had not been turned over); EZELL, supra note 20, at 206 (discussing
an investigation into bogus lottery project); SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 45 (discussing
an investigation of lottery operators for scandal and fraud).
28. Missouri and Kentucky were the only states in which lotteries were not
prohibited. EZELL, supra note 20, at 229; SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 50-51.
29. Blakey & Kurland, supra note 20, at 931.
30. Id.

31. See Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 6, 4 Stat. 238 (prohibiting postmaster
from serving as lottery agents and from receiving "lottery schemes, circulars, or
tickets" free of postage); Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196
(unlawful to deposit in the mails any lottery materials with the post-office); Act of
June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 283, 302 (unlawful to convey by mail or deposit
in a post-office, materials concerning illegal lotteries).
32. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194.
3S. Id.
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the postal authorities, if they had opened suspect mail to ascertain its
contents, might have been violating the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and would likely have been penalized. In
1872, Congress reworded the 1868 Act to leave only illegal lotteries
34
subject to the Act.
Congress once again struck at state lotteries in 1876.35 This Act
banned deposit in the mails of any letters or circulars concerning
lotteries, both illegal and those charted by state legislatures.1 6 The
Supreme Court one year later rejected a First Amendment challenge
to the 1876 Act in Ex parte Jackson.37 Nevertheless, pressure on
Congress continued with the persistence of lotteries, particularly the
infamous Louisiana Lottery.38
The Louisiana Lottery used the mails as its principal way to
advertise nationwide and obtain revenues from out-of-state residents.3 9
The Louisiana legislatures were unwilling to shut down the lottery
because of the enormous amounts of revenues it brought into the
state. Moreover, the 1876 Act was viewed as ineffective at shutting
down the lottery because a loophole allowed it to solicit customers
through newspaper advertisements. In 1890, responding to the increasing opposition to social problems created by the Louisiana Lottery
and protests over its nationwide monopoly, Congress banned from
the mails, newspapers that contained anything at all having to do
with lotteries.40 This 1890 Act was the death blow for the Louisianabased lottery. In 1892, the Supreme Court upheld this Act against a
First Amendment challenge in Ex parte Rapier.4 '
34. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283.
35. See Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90.
36. Id.
37. 96 U.S. 727 (1878) (holding Congress has the power to constitutionally
designate what shall be excluded from the mail).
38. The Louisiana Lottery was established by a New York gambling syndicate
which had bribed the Reconstruction Era Louisiana legislatures in order to obtain a
charter granting them a monopoly within the state. See HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER'S
PROGRESS: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIES TO

CANFIELD

52-56.

85 (1969);

EZELL, supra note

20, at 242-44;

SULLIVAN, supra

note 20, at

39. See Rychlack, supra note 21, at 42. "Ninety-three percent of the lottery's

gross revenues came from outside Louisiana." Id. Moreover, "[a]t its peak, the

[Louisiana Lottery] probably netted almost $5 million in profit every year." DEVEL20, at 675.
40. See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465 (codified at 18.U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1988)).
41. 143 U.S. 110, 135 (1892) (affirming the decision of Exparte Jackson); see
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
OPMENTS, supra note
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The legislation did not end there, however. The Louisiana Lottery, wounded by the 1890 Act, relocated to Honduras in an attempt
to operate without using the United States mails. Congress this time
struck at lotteries through the Commerce Clause 42 by forbidding the
transportation of lottery materials in interstate or foreign commerce
in the Act of 1895.43 In 1903, the Supreme Court once again reinforced
the social policy against lotteries by upholding the 1895 Act against a
Commerce Clause attack in Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case)." After
hearing oral arguments three times, the Court dismissed the contention
that the statute infringed upon powers reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. 45 Justice Harlan, emphasized Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 46 which introduced the
Commerce Clause as a means in which the federal government could
regulate trade among the states. 47 Justice Harlan dismissed the Tenth
Amendment issue because "the power to regulate commerce among
the states ha[d] been expressly delegated to Congress." ' 4 This federal
antilottery legislation remains part of the law today. 49
The federal and state antilottery laws of the late nineteenth
century purged the nation of the social evils associated with the
corrupt Louisiana Lottery. The mid-twentieth century, however,
brought with it a movement by the states to decriminalize lotteries.
Lotteries, once again, became a politically favorable means of augmenting state incomes.5 0 Generally, lotteries were perceived as rela42. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign

nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3.
43. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Stat. 963 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1988)).
44. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
45. Id. at 357-58.
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Writing for the Court in Champion, Justice
Harlan quoted extensively from Gibbons:
[The commerce power] is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested
in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and

acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
Champion, 188 U.S. at 347 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9) (emphasis
added in Champion).
47. Champion, 188 U.S. at 346-47.
48. Id. at 357.

49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988) (forbidding the importation and transportation
of lottery materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988) (prohibiting the mailing of lotteryrelated materials).
50. Blakey & Kurland, supra note 20, at 950. "In 1963, New Hampshire became
the first state in modern times to establish a lottery to raise revenue." Id. at n. 114.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

tively harmless, and citizens by far preferred lotteries over an increase
in taxes." By 1978, fourteen states had authorized lotteries. 2 Notwithstanding the modern trend by states to conduct state-run lotteries,
the federal laws, originally enacted to assist states' antilottery efforts,
at first hindered the new state-run operators."
A major obstacle confronting new state-operated lotteries was
their inability to advertise. To further regulate lotteries, after the birth
of radio and television, Congress enacted the federal prohibition
against the broadcasting of lottery-related information, 18 U.S.C. §
1304,14 as part of section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934,5s
as amended by the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of
1988.56 For enforcement, the Federal Communications Commission

("FCC") was granted power to revoke a broadcaster's license for

violating section 1304.11 This legislation was all part of the federal
51. DEvELOPMENTS, supra note 20, at 678-84 (discussing the implication of
lotteries as a form of "painless" taxation).
52. Id. at 679. These new lotteries were much more efficient because of the
computer and were generally thought of as corruption-proof. Id. at 539-40.
53. Blakey & Kurland, supra note 20, at 950.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988). Providing as follows:
Broadcasting lottery information
Whoever broadcasts by any means of any radio or television station
for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever,
operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any
advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all
of such prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
Id.
55. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 316, 48 Stat. 1088 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988)) (imposing criminal penalties upon any licensed
radio broadcaster who "knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement
of or information concerning any lottery .

. . .").

See also FCC v. American

Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 289 (1954) (extending to radio coverage the power
of Congress constitutionally to restrict interstate dissemination of lottery materials
recognized in Ex parte Rapier).
56. Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206. Providing as follows:
If any provision of this Act or the amendments made by this Act, or the
application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the
application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to
other circumstances, shall not be affected by such invalidation.
Id.
57. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1992). An additional statute also provides that a

1994:5491

UNITED STATES v. EDGE BROADCASTING

lottery control scheme created in the late nineteenth century.
In 1975, recognizing that an exemption was needed to accommodate the legal operation of state-run lotteries, Congress amended
the statutory scheme by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1307,58 which allowed

the broadcasting of lottery-related advertisements by those radio or
television stations licensed by the FCC to a state which conducts a
state-run lottery.59 In crafting this exemption, Congress recognized
the potential problems created because broadcast signals cannot be
confined to the boundaries of their respective states. The legislative

history of section 1307 shows that Congress considered a number of
alternatives since they were well aware of the inequities that exceptions
6
based on license location would create. 0 Initially, the proposed legcivil forfeiture penalty of up to $2,000 may be imposed in the event of a § 1304
violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1988).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988). Providing in relevant part:
Exceptions relating to certain advertisements and other information and to
state-conducted lotteries
(a) The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304 shall not
apply to(1) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery
conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law which is(A) contained in a publication published in that State or in a State which
conducts such a lottery; or
(B) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that
State or a State which conducts such a lottery; or
(2) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, other than one described in
paragraph (1), that is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the State in
which it is conducted and which is(A) conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization; or
(B) conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization and
is clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization.
Id.
59. In enacting § 1307, Congress recognized the policy implications which arose
in the area of federalism. The House Judiciary Committee specifically acknowledged
that this exemption was an imperfect solution: "in considering this legislation the
committee was faced with the task of making a reasonable balance between Federal
and State interests" in regulation of dissemination of lottery information. H.R. REP.
No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007, 7011. Congress
chose to advance "protection of the policies and the interests of the States which do
not provide for such lotteries." Id.
60. Id. at 7010, 7022; see also Letter of FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley,
H.R. REP. No. 93-1517, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7021 (noting "broadcast
signals, as a technological matter, cannot be confined to political boundaries"). Even
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islation confined the exemption to those broadcasting stations "located in" lottery states. However, a letter from the FCC suggesting
the reasoning and implications of using the location of license as a
more acceptable criterion prompted an amendment to the initial draft
to include location of license language. 61 In 1988, Congress once again
addressed the inequalities created by this location of license language
when it considered a series of amendments which would have expanded the section 1307 exemption to all advertising concerning any
lottery "conducted by a state acting under authority of state law.' '62
The Bill passed the House but was amended by the Senate to retain
the language keyed to location of license. 63 The 1988 amendments
essentially ratified the section 1307 exemption scheme as it stands
today. Accordingly, only those radio stations licensed to a lottery
state may broadcast lottery advertisements.
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

Modern commercial speech analysis has moved from a rigid
approach first suggested in 1942 towards a far more liberal method
prior judicial decisions recognized the inequities that arose under § 1307. In United
States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, Justice Douglas in his dissent wrote,
inter alia, in a starred unnumbered footnote:
As the State of New Hampshire points out, the new § 1307 even on its face
does not resolve the claims of all parties to this action. New Hampshire,
which was granted leave to intervene in the Court of Appeals, conducts a
lottery; neighboring Vermont does not. Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1970), upon which the court relies, applies only to broadcasts by
a station in the State which conducts the lottery, or in an adjacent State
which also conducts a lottery; presumably, then, § 1304 remains applicable
to a Vermont radio station which desires to broadcast information concerning the New Hampshire lottery. The restraint imposed by § 1304 will thus
continue to inhibit the New Hampshire lottery with respect to certain groups
of prospective participants, including New Hampshire residents who listen
to Vermont radio stations and Vermont residents who might wish to cross
the state line and participate.
United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, 420 U.S. 371, 375 (1975). Edge
Broadcasting presents similar issues to which Justice Douglas so referred when first
addressing § 1307.
61. Letter of FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley, H.R. REp. No. 93-1517,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7019-21. The commission recommended the location
of license language in order to avoid conflicting interpretations where a radio station
may be located in a place different from the location specified in its license. Id. at
7021-22.
62. Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100625, § 2(a)(1), 102 Stat. 3205.
65. Id.

UNITED STATES v. EDGE BROADCASTING
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in 1993. In 1942, the Court held that commercial advertising did not
merit First Amendment protection.64 Then in the early 1970s, the
Court began to reconsider the commercial speech doctrine and moved
towards an approach which extended limited First Amendment pro65
tection to commercial speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court
reversed the criminal conviction of an editor of a weekly newspaper
who had advertised low-cost abortion services available in an adjoining
state, since the activity proscribed had been rendered legal in Roe v.
Wade. 6 The Court recognized that a state may have a legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens' health and welfare as they travel to
other states, but nothing in that interest gave them the right to
prohibit "disseminating information about an activity that is legal in
that State.' '67 Although at first glance this appeared to extend First
Amendment protection to commercial speech, some commentators
have noted that this decision was narrowly tailored to prohibit states
from restricting advertisements only about activities which were constitutionally guaranteed.6
One year later, the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of
69
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. held that
speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction
70
merits First Amendment protection. In Virginia State Board of
pharmaPharmacy, the Court struck down a statute which restricted
7 A consumer
drugs.
prescription
of
prices
cists from advertising the
group had challenged the restriction as a violation of the First
Amendment, arguing that they had the right to receive price infor72
mation about the prescription drugs. The countervailing state interest
asserted was that the suppression of price advertising would maintain
the high degree of professionalism required from pharmacists." The
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824-25.
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW §

16.31, at 1019 (4th ed. 1991). Commentators noted that although Bigelow suggested

that only constitutionally protected activities enjoyed First Amendment protection,

one year later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court expanded the doctrine

to include commercial speech, which indicated that a narrow reading of Bigelow was
inappropriate. Id.
69. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
70. Id. at 770.
71. Id. at 753-54.

72. Id.

73. Id. at 767-68.

560
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Court held that Virginia's asserted interest in maintaining professionalism did not survive constitutional review because the First Amendment forbids a state from deciding that ignorance is preferable to the
free flow of information. 74
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy represented the first instance
where the Court acknowledged the right of a receiver to the free flow
of commercial information, and that government induced ignorance
was to be disfavored. 75 This landmark case, essentially set the tone for
the commercial speech decisions that followed.
Although the Supreme Court recognized commercial speech had
limited protection under Virginia State Boardof Pharmacy, it rejected
strict scrutiny as the standard of review, which is usually applied to
content-regulated speech, and instead developed a four part test in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission7 6
to determine the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial
speech. First, the speech must be lawful and not be misleading. 77
Second, the asserted state interest furthered by the restriction must be
substantial. 7 Third, the restriction must directly advance the asserted
state interest.79 Finally, the restriction must be no more restrictive
than necessary to serve the asserted state interest.8 0 Basically, "[tihe
last two steps of the Central Hudson [test) involve a 'fit' between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." 8 '
In Central Hudson, the Court held that a restriction by a state's
public utility commission, which banned promotional advertising of
an electric company, violated the First Amendment because it failed
the third and fourth prongs of the test developed in that opinion. The
restriction failed the third prong because the link between the advertising prohibition and the equity of the utility company's rate structure
was simply too speculative and tenuous, at best. 2 Nor did the restriction satisfy the fourth prong because it applied to all promotional
74. Id. at 766, 770.
75. Id.

76. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a comprehensive discussion of the development
and subsequent application of the CentralHudson test see John C. Coots, Note, A

Missed Opportunity to Definitively Apply the Central Hudson Test: Fane v. Edenfield, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1155, 1170-82 (1993).

77. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986).
82. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
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advertising regardless of whether it would have actually served to
increase energy use, and was not the least restrictive means of furthering energy conservation. s3
In 1986, the Central Hudson test was examined in Posadas de
84
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico. The Court
in Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates was faced with a constitutional
challenge of a Puerto Rico gambling restriction that banned the
advertisement of gambling to local residents but allowed gambling
5
advertisements directed at American tourists. In reasserting the
validity of the Central Hudson test, the Court held that all four
prongs of the test were satisfied. 6 Particularly noteworthy in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates was that the underlying activity, gambling,
was not a constitutionally protected right such as the right to travel
or right to privacy. Thus, the Court stated: "it is precisely because
the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the
underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take
the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the
7
demand through restrictions on advertising."" In other words, the
Court embraces the principle that "the greater power to completely
ban [an activity] necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of [that activity]. ' ' a
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, advocated a strict scrutiny approach to restrictions on
89
truthful advertisements about lawful activity. The dissenters believed
that the Central Hudson test was too relaxed and would not protect
commercial speech as well as a strict scrutiny approach. They 9noted
that the majority simply "tipp[ed] its hat to these standards" and
essentially deferred to their determination that Puerto Rico's ban was
83. Id. at 569-70.
84. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
85. Id. at 330.

86. Id. at 344. The Court acknowledged that the advertisements were neither
misleading nor proposed an illegal activity. Id. at 340-41. Moreover, it acknowledged
that the legislature's belief that gambling had harmful effects on the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens constituted a "substantial" governmental interest. Id. at
341. Further the Court found that the advertising restriction "directly advanced the
legislature's interest in reducing demand for games of chance." Id. at 342. Finally,
the Court held the restriction was narrowly tailored to apply only to residents of
Puerto Rico and would not affect advertising aimed at tourists. Id. at 343-44.

87. Id. at 346.

88. Id.at 345-46.
89. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id.at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reasonable. 9' Some commentators have also criticized the majority's
approach and suggested that after this decision, the Central Hudson
test was no longer an intermediate standard of review, but rather a
de facto rationality standard. 92
Nine years after the Court promulgated the Central Hudson test,
the Court modified the fourth prong of the test-whether the restriction is no more restrictive than necessary to serve the asserted state
interest-in Board of Trustees v. Fox.93 The Fox Court examined the
use of the word "necessary" to determine whether the restriction
required the least restrictive means of advancing the asserted state
interest or rather a means which was merely reasonable. 94 The Court
noted that it had repeatedly utilized a strict interpretation of the word
"necessary"

which would suggest a "least-restrictive-means" test. 95
On the other hand, many of the Court's decisions had also suggested
that a more narrowly tailored approach was appropriate. 96 The Court

91. Id.
92. See, e.g.,

A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT
175 (1993). Commentators noted: "Posadas illustrates that the
Central Hudson test is not necessarily a predictable doctrinal tool. Instead, it is
sufficiently malleable so that it can be used to approximate, in some circumstances,
not the intermediate standard of review, but the deferential rationality standard
itself." Id.
93. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Id. at 476. Fox involved students in a university dormitory who had
challenged a resolution that prohibited private commercial enterprises, in this case
tupperware representatives, from operating in university facilities on the basis that it
violated their rights under the First Amendment. Id. at 471-72. The parties stipulated
that the speech was not misleading and involved a legal activity. Id. at 475. The
Court then held the university's interest in promoting an educational rather than a
commercial atmosphere on its campus was substantial. Id. The Court agreed with
the court of appeal's decision to remand for further factual determination of whether
the resolution directly advanced the university's interests. Id. at 476. Thus, the sole
issue decided in Fox was whether the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test
required a "least-restrictive-means" analysis. Id. at 471.
95. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981)
(plurality opinion); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 644 (1985); Posadas
de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 343 (1986); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
96. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 207; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984) (holding
application of the Central Hudson test is "substantially similar" to application of
the test to determine the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions-a test
which the Court specifically held does not require least restrictive means).
LAW IN A NUTSHELL
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resolved the matter by adopting "something short of a least-restrictivemeans standard." 97 Thus, the Court stated:
What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,-a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents
not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope
is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in
other contexts ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the

desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation
may best be employed. 9
In the aftermath of Central Hudson and Fox, the Court was left
with a paternalistic view towards commercial speech. One might even
suggest that the Central Hudson test closed the doors on full First
Amendment protection offered for commercial speech in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy. However, the three cases decided during
the 1993 Term of the United States Supreme Court suggest that not
all doors to protection of commercial speech are locked."
The first of the commercial speech cases decided during the 1993
Term was Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,100 which struck

down a Cincinnati ordinance that prohibited "commercial" newsracks
0
on public property, but permitted "noncommercial" newsracks.' 1
Justice Stevens reaffirmed the First Amendment protection accorded
02
commercial speech since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.1 Discovery Network has particular significance because the Court reinforced
the principle established in Fox, inter alia, that the government bears
the burden of demonstrating a "reasonable fit" between the asserted
03
interest and the means chosen to serve that interest. In Discovery
Network, Cincinnati claimed that the removal of newsracks containing
commercial information furthered safety and esthetics in public ar97.
98.
99.
v. Fane,

Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Edenfield
113 S.Ct. 1792 (1993); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct.

2696 (1993).

100. 113 S.Ct. 1505 (1993).
101. Id. at 1517.
102. Id.

103. Id. at 1510 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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eas. 10 4 However, the City rested its premise on the fact that the
noncommercial information which remained on the newsracks, although of a larger quantum, was more valuable in content. 105 The
Court rejected this contention because it attached too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech and underestimated the value of commercial speech. 106 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the City failed to establish the "fit"
between the restriction and its goals as required under Fox.0 7
The Court then considered the City's argument that under Ward
v. Rock Against Racism'08 the ban on "commercial handbills" was a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. 109 Cincinnati argued
that its restriction was not related to the handbill's content and thus
the restriction was justified because it was content neutral. "10 However,
the Court flatly rejected that argument as unpersuasive because even
a "commonsense understanding of the term [content neutral]""'
suggested that "the very basis of the regulation [was] the difference
in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech."" 2
Accordingly, the ban was content-based not content neutral, and
could not be justified as a legitimate time, place, and manner restriction." 3 Thus, the ban did not survive First Amendment scrutiny
104. The City argued "that there is a close fit between its ban on newsracks
dispensing 'commercial handbills' and its interest in safety and esthetics because every
decrease in the number of such dispensing devices necessarily effects an increase in
safety and an improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape." Id. at 1511.
105. Id.
106. Id. Noting the difficulties in drawing bright line rules which distinguish on
the basis of commercial and noncommercial content, the Court nonetheless held:
[i]n the absence of some basis for distinguishing between "newspapers" and
"commercial handbills" that [was] relevant to an interest asserted
by the
city, [it was] unwilling to recognize Cincinnati's bare assertion that the "low
value" of commercial speech [was] a sufficient justification for its selective
and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing "commercial handbills."
Id. at 1516.
107. Id.
108. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The Ward Court held: "government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of [engaging in] protected
speech, provided that restrictions 'are [adequately] justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech .

. . ."'

Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).

109. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 1516.

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.at 1516-17.
Id.at 1516.
Id.at 1517.
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because it was neither "narrowly tailored" nor content neutral.
In Edenfield v. Fane,"4 the second of the Supreme Court's 1993
Term commercial speech decisions, the Court held a ban on in-person
solicitation by certified public accountants ("CPAs") was unconstitutional."' The Court distinguished Edenfield from its decision in
6
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 11 which upheld a ban on in-person
solicitation by attorneys, because the Board of Accountancy failed to
"demonstrate that, as applied in the business context, the ban on
CPA solicitation advance[d] its asserted interests in any direct and
material way.""' 7 Discussing the third prong of the Central Hudson
test, the Court reasoned that CPAs, unlike attorneys, are not "pro'
fessional[s] trained in the art of persuasion,"" and moreover solicitation of clients by CPAs usually occurs in a business setting as
opposed to a stressful and vulnerable setting in which lawyers often
find their clients." 9 Thus, Edenfield reaffirmed that the party defending a restriction on commercial speech, which is not misleading or
substantial, carries the burden of justifying it. And more importantly
that "Itihis burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture;
rather, the governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that 0its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree."12
Unfortunately, after a positive treatment of commercial speech
in Discovery Network and Edenfield, the Court restricted advertising
Co. ,121
of commercial speech in United States v. Edge Broadcasting
the third commercial speech decision of the 1993 Term.

114. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
115. Id. at 1796. But cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(holding ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers is constitutional).
116. 436 U.S. 447 (1993). In Ohralik, the Court examined the limits of state
restrictions preventing in-person solicitation by attorneys. Albert Ohralik, an attorney,
solicited a young accident victim in the hospital and the victim's passenger at her
home. Id. at 450-51. The Court held that Ohralik could be constitutionally sanctioned
for violation of the state restrictions because of the potential during in-person
solicitation for fraud and overreaching by trained advocates. Id. at 462.
117. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
60, 71 n.20 (1983)) (holding "[tihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on
U.S.
463
commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it").
118. Id. at 1802.
119. Id. at 1802-03.
120. Id. at 1800.
121. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
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v. EDGE BROADCASTING Co.

HISTORY OF THE CASE

Edge Broadcasting Company ("Edge") is a FM radio station
licensed by the FCC to operate in Elizabeth City, North Carolina.122
Although licensed to Elizabeth City, Edge broadcasts from Moyock,
North Carolina, which is approximately three miles from the North
Carolina-Virginia border. Due to its location, more than 92wo of its
listeners are in Virginia, and the remaining listeners live in nine North
Carolina counties. 23 At issue in Edge Broadcasting was whether 18

U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307, which prohibit the broadcasting of lottery
advertising by a broadcaster licensed to a state that does not sponsor
a lottery, while allowing lottery advertising by a broadcaster licensed
to a state that sponsors a lottery, are, as applied to Edge, consistent

with the First Amendment. 24
North Carolina does not sponsor a lottery and therefore prohibits
lotteries and lottery advertising. 25 Virginia, on the other hand, has
sponsored a lottery since 1987, when Virginia voters chose by referendum to legalize lotteries. 26 Virginia has vigorously entered the
lottery marketplace and spends millions of dollars each year for lottery

advertising in both broadcast and printed media. 27 Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1304 and 1307, a broadcasting station licensed in North Carolina

122. Id. at 2702. This station has the call letters WMYK-FM and is promoted
and known as "Power 94." Id.
123. Id. "Power 94 is one of 24 radio stations serving the Hampton Roads,
Virginia, metropolitan area." Id.
124. Id. at 2700.
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289, -291 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (making
advertising or operating nonexempt raffles or lotteries punishable by a fine not to
exceed $2,000 or a prison sentence of no more than six months, or both).
126. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-4001 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993) (establishing
state lottery to produce revenue for the general welfare of its people and to be used
for the public purpose).
127. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 635 (E.D. Va.
1990).
Advertising the Virginia lottery is big business, both for the Virginia Lottery
Board and for the many private retailers affiliated with the lottery. Excluding
the cost of production, for example, the Lottery Board spent $1,202,905.00
on its introductory advertising campaign. It spent a total of $4,354,199 to
introduce its first three instant games. At the time of the trial, it anticipated
spending about $2.3 million to introduce its on-line games and about $3
million a year to sustain them.
Brief for the Respondent at *9-10, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.
Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. Briefs file).
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may not broadcast lottery advertisements even if its signal reaches
into Virginia, but a broadcasting station licensed in Virginia may
broadcast lottery advertisements even if its service area extends beyond
Virginia into a nonlottery state. Thus, sections 1304 and 1307 prohibit
Edge from broadcasting Virginia lottery advertisements because of its
licensing location, a nonlottery state. As a result, Edge claimed that
it has lost, and will continue to lose, advertising revenues totalling in
the millions of128dollars from its inability to carry Virginia lottery
advertisements.
Edge challenged the constitutionality of sections 1304 and 1307,
as well as corresponding FCC regulations, in the United States District
129
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Edge sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes and regulations were an invalid restriction
3°
on commercial speech and a violation of the First Amendment and
3' of the
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
United States Constitution. 3 2 Edge further sought injunction protec3 3 After
tion against enforcement of those statutes and regulations.
alternate motions to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the
were denied, the case was submitted on agreed facts for
United States
31 4
hearing.
The district court recognized that Congress has greater latitude
to regulate commercial speech which directly promotes an existing
lottery than other forms of noncommercial speech, such as the
broadcasting of editorials for or against a lottery or a list of winning
numbers and prize amounts, a construction which the government did
not oppose.' 35 With regard to lottery advertising, the district court
assessed the restrictions under the established four part test for
Hudson Gas & Electric
commercial speech as set forth in Central
13 6
Corp. v. Public Service Commission:

128. Edge Broadcasting Co., 732 F. Supp. at 635.
129. Id. at 634.

130. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . .. deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
132. Edge Broadcasting Co., 732 F. Supp. at 635.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 636-38.
136. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text for
discussion of the development and application of the CentralHudson test.
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At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. [1] For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquires
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
37
serve that interest.
The district court concluded that the first, second, and fourth
parts of the CentralHudson test were met.' Specifically, the district
court assumed that Edge, if allowed to, would air nonmisleading
advertisements about the Virginia lottery, a legal activity. '9 Then, the
court determined that the furtherance of the fundamental interests of
federalism, which enable North Carolina to protect its citizens from
the harms associated with gambling, was a substantial state interest.'40
The court noted that this interest was similar to state and federal
interests which other courts had recognized as "substantial." 4' Moreover, the court concluded that sections 1304 and 1307 met the relaxed
standard enunciated in Fox which construed Central Hudson's fourth
prong as employing "not necessarily the least restrictive means but
a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."'' 42
As to the third prong of the Central Hudson test, however, the
court held that sections 1304 and 1307, as applied to Edge, were
137. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
138. Edge Broadcasting Co., 732 F. Supp. at 641.
139. Id. at 638.
140. Id.
141. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69 (state law restricting utility advertising
designed to reduce energy consumption recognized as valid); Posadas de P.R. Assocs.
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (regulation restricting selected
forms of gambling while permitting other forms of gambling recognized as valid);
New York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 996-97 (2d
Cir. 1969) (federal ban on lottery advertising serves substantial government interest);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (FCC regulation of cigarette
advertising intended to reduce cigarette consumption implied as valid); Oklahoma
Broadcasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 636 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (state law
prohibition on liquor advertising designed to reduce consumption of alcohol recognized as valid).
142. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). The district court in
Edge Broadcasting noted that "it is difficult to envision a more narrowly tailored set
of provisions than those set forth in sections 1304 and 1307." Edge Broadcasting
Co., 732 F. Supp. at 642.
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ineffective in advancing North Carolina's interest in reducing lottery
participation because the North Carolina residents who resided in
Edge's service area in North Carolina "receive[d] most of their radio,
newspaper and television communication from Virginia-based media." 143 Accordingly, the challenged lottery provisions, as applied to

Edge, were violative of the third prong of the Central Hudson test
speech. 144
and failed to justify an infringement on First Amendment
A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished
per curium opinion,'4 5 affirmed the district court's judgment in all
respects, rejecting the challenge that the district court had erred in
1' 6
judging the validity of the statutes on an "as applied" standard.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because it believed
the Fourth Circuit had used questionable reasoning in holding sections

1304 and 1307 were an unconstitutional restriction of commercial
speech. 147 The Court reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit,
1304 and 1307 were constitutional,
concluding instead that sections
148
even as applied to Edge.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The United States Supreme Court found sections 1304 and 1307
constitutional under the Central Hudson test. Therefore, the Court
began its opinion by stating it would not consider the government's
argument not to proceed with a Central Hudson analysis because
lotteries were once considered to be "vices." The government had
necescontended that the greater power to prohibit vices all together
149
advertising.
their
regulate
to
sarily included the lesser power
143. Edge BroadcastingCo., 732 F. Supp. at 639.
144. Id. at 639-41.
145. Although the United States Supreme Court in Edge Broadcastingpurported
to review the decision of the Fourth Circuit, it was necessary to also examine the
reasoning of the district court because the Fourth Circuit did not publish their
opinion. The Supreme Court in its decision stated in a footnote: "[wie deem it
remarkable and unusual that although the court of appeals affirmed a judgment that
an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate
to announce its judgment in an unpublished per curium opinion." United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2702 n.3 (1993). Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit filed a published opinion on August 31, 1993. Edge Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992) (amending the previous unpublished per
curium opinion filed Feb. 27, 1992 to be published).
146. Edge Broadcasting Co., 5 F.3d at 62.
147. Edge BroadcastingCo., 113 S. Ct. at 2703.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
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Proceeding under the CentralHudson general scheme for assessing government restrictions on commercial speech, the Court assumed
that the first factor was met in that Edge, if allowed to, would air
nonmisleading advertisements about the Virginia lottery. 5 0 The Court
further stated that, "as to the second Central Hudson factor, [it was]
quite sure that the Government ha[d] a substantial interest in supporting the polic[ies] of nonlottery states, as well as not interfering
with the polic[ies] of states that permit lotteries." 15 ' However, the
Court disagreed with the reasoning of the lower courts in applying
the third and fourth factors of Central Hudson.
The third factor of Central Hudson requires that the regulation
directly advance the asserted state interest. 5 2 In this case, the interest
asserted was North Carolina's desire to discourage its citizens from
gambling. The Court noted that the third prong of the CentralHudson
test cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether the state's
interest was directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity.'
Thus, the lower courts did not fully appreciate the congressional
balancing of the policy concerns of lottery and nonlottery states and
this balancing was the substantial state interest satisfied by Central
Hudson's third factor. 4 Additionally, this interest was served by
considering the effect of sections 1304 and 1307 as applied to all
stations in North Carolina, and not just as applied to Edge. 55
The Court held that the application of sections 1304 and 1307 to
Edge was more properly analyzed under the fourth Central Hudson
factor, whether the lottery restrictions were more extensive than
necessary to serve North Carolina's antigambling policy. 5 6 Board of
Trustees v. Fox'5 7 modified the fourth factor of the Central Hudson
test, concluding that the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions should be judged by standards no less stringent than those
applied to expressive conduct entitled to full First Amendment pro328 (1986) (holding gambling implicates no constitutionally protected right, rather, it
falls into a category of activity normally considered as "vices" which can and
frequently have been banned all together).
150. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2702.

151. Id. at 2703.
152. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the third

factor of the CentralHudson test.
153. Edge BroadcastingCo., 113 S.Ct. at 2704.

154. Id.

155. Id.

156. Id.

157. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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tection or to time, place, and manner restrictions. 5 ' The Supreme
Court made clear in Fox that it was not requiring the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the government's interest but rather a means
which was merely reasonable."19 Applying this reasoning, the Court
held it was reasonable to require Edge to comply with the statutory
restrictions in airing lottery advertisements because to do otherwise
would allow Virginia's lottery policy to dictate what stations in an
adjoining state may air.160
Additionally, the Court looked to its prior decision in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism 61 which dealt with a time, place, and manner
restriction that required the city to control the sound level of concerts
in a city park, concerts entitled to full First Amendment protection.162
In Ward, the Court upheld the restriction, stating that "the validity
of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall
problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which
it furthers the government's interest in an individual case." 163 Applying
the Ward holding to Edge Broadcasting, the Court rejected the claim
that, as applied to Edge, North Carolina's policy of discouraging
gambling was not furthered because listeners within the nine-county
area of North Carolina were "inundated" with Virginia lottery advertisements. Instead, the Court" held the proper analysis was to
determine the relation that sections 1304 and 1307 bear to the general
problem of accommodating the policies of both lottery and nonlottery
In this case, the lottery restrictions, as applied to the whole
states. 164
population of the nation, directly advanced the fundamental interests
of federalism by minimizing the potential for conflicts created by
neighboring states with different policies.
More importantly, the Court rejected the view that an individual
entity could challenge a restriction on commercial speech as applied
only to an individual's own circumstances, noting that none of its
prior decisions suggested such an analysis. 165 Nonetheless, the Court
158. Id. at 477-78. See supra notes 93-98 for a discussion of the Court's
modification of the Central Hudson test in Fox.
159. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
160. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2705.
161. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 801.
164. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2705.
165. Id. at 2707. Justices Souter and Kennedy in their concurring opinion took
no position on this issue. Id. at 2708 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978) (rejecting view that State must show
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held that even if it were to accept this view, it disagreed with the
lower court's judgment that sections 1304 and 1307, as applied to
Edge, furnished no more than ineffective or remote support for North
Carolina's antigambling laws. The Court found significant the fact
that 127,000 North Carolina listeners in the nine-county area within
Edge's service area also received Virginia broadcasts and newspapers
carrying lottery advertisements.'" Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that the restriction, as applied to the 127,000 residents in North
Carolina, at least minimally advanced North Carolina's objective of
discouraging gambling.
The Court further noted that to hold in favor of Edge might
advocate a piecemeal approach which would treat stations close to a
state border as if they were on the other side. 167 The spiral effect of
such a holding would be that if Edge were allowed to broadcast
lottery advertisements that reached a certain location, other North
Carolina stations also reaching that location would then challenge
sections 1304 and 1307 as ineffective when applied to them. The Court
stated it was "unwilling to start down that road.' 1 68 Thus, the Court
held sections 1304 and 1307 satisfied all parts of the CentralHudson
test and accordingly did not violate the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 69
Dissenting, Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with the majority's
holding that the United States had met the burden of demonstrating
a "reasonable fit" between the government's selective ban on lottery
advertisements and the asserted interest in protecting antigambling
policies of nonlottery states. 170 Justice Stevens disagreed with the
by applying a prophylactic rule the State's interest were advanced as applied to
individual's own acts of solicitation); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993)
(applying commercial speech challenge to a broad class of individuals not just to one
particular individual's acts of solicitation).
166. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2706. Moreover the Court stated:
Even if all of the residents of Edge's North Carolina service area listen to
lottery ads from Virginia stations, it would still be true that 1107% of radio
listening time in that area would remain free of such material. If Edge is
allowed to advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening time
carrying such material would increase from 38% to 49°7o. We do not think
that Central Hudson compels us to consider the consequence to be without
significance.

Id.

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2708.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
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means by which the federal government chose to manipulate public

behavior, 171 and accordingly reasoned that a selective and intrusive
ban on truthful and nonmisleading information about a perfectly legal
activity conducted in another state, unless justified by a truly sub-

stantial government interest, could not withstand First Amendment
scrutiny. 7 2 Justice Stevens further disagreed that the federal government's interest in supporting nonlottery states' antigambling policies
was substantial. 7 He noted that while the government and the states
may have an interest in promoting antigambling policies, it is undermined by the fact that virtually the entire country is now embracing
state-run lotteries. 174 Even the State of North Carolina, whose policies
are purportedly being safeguarded in this decision, is considering
legislation to establish a state-run lottery. 175 Thus, Justice Stevens
concluded that the Court erred in holding sections 1304 and 1307
76
satisfied the second and fourth parts of the Central Hudson test. 1

111.

AN ALYSIS

In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 17 7 the United States
Supreme Court superficially applied the four part Central Hudson
test and simply disregarded the important principles which were
reaffirmed and expanded upon in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc. 7 and Edenfield v. Fane.79 The Court utilized a mere rationality
basis review in complete disregard for the standards promulgated in
1
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.80
113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (reaffirming belief that proponents of commercial speech
restriction bear the burden of demonstrating "reasonable fit" between the legislature's
goals and the asserted state interest).
171. Justice Stevens stated that "[he] would hold that suppressing truthful
advertising regarding a neighboring State's lottery, an activity which is, of course,
perfectly legal, is a patently unconstitutional means of effectuating the Government's
asserted interest in protecting the policies of nonlottery States." Edge Broadcasting
Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Thirty-four States and thp District of
Columbia now sponsor a lottery. Three more States will initiate lotteries this year.
Of the remaining 13 States, at least 5 States have recently considered or are currently
considering establishing a lottery." Id.
175. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2708-1 f (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
178. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); see also supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
179. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); see also supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
180. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, although the Court did not expressly address whether Edge
Broadcastingcould be properly decided under Posadasde Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,'' it is disturbing that
Justice White cited this decision at all in his analysis, instead of
Discovery Network. Finally, the Court ignored the precedential value
of Bigelow v. Virginia,8 2 in which the Court held a state may not
strike a paternalistic approach towards its citizens as they venture into
other states. "83

The Court assumed that Edge, if allowed to, would air nonmisleading and truthful advertisements about the Virginia lottery.8 4 The
majority further concluded that "[a]s to the second Central Hudson
factor, [it was] quite sure that the Government ha[d] a substantial
interest in supporting the policies of nonlottery states, as well as not
interfering with the policies of states that permit lotteries."'' 5 The
troubling aspect of this statement regarding the second factor, however, was that the Court disregarded the sweeping trend by states to
sponsor state-run lotteries.' 6 Instead, the Court implicitly assumed
that because Congress at one time assisted states' efforts to control
gambling, that this effort constituted the substantial governmental
interest.8 7 Of course, the Court also assumed that the states still
desired federal assistance in regulating lotteries, an assumption Justice
Stevens noted was made with no supporting evidence. 8
The Court reasoned that the substantial governmental interest
underlying the restriction was protection of the policies of nonlottery
states while not interfering with the policies of lottery states.'8 9 So the
Court merely engaged in deferential review of the policy interests
behind the antilottery statutory scheme. However, the Court never
mentioned that the social problems and fraudulent concerns once
thought to accompany public lotteries are largely alleviated in the
twentieth century. Lottery proceeds are now often used to fund
education and community projects.'19 Modern-day technology and
181. 478 U.S. 328 (1986); see also supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.

182. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
183. Id. at 824-25.
184. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
185. Id.
186. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the social
problems associated with the nineteenth century lotteries.
188. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2703.
190. For example, lottery profits are often earmarked for local education
programs, local cities and towns, property tax relief, and local transportation and
support for the elderly. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 20, at 683.
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strict accounting practices over lottery proceeds undermine the concerns over fraud and corruption, which almost always accompanied

the nineteenth century lotteries.19'
Although one can not dispute the Court's desire to protect the
policy interests underlying federalism, it does not serve as a legitimate
justification for the Court's complete disregard of intermediate scru-

tiny in favor of mere rationality review. In Discovery Network, the
Court flatly rejected a mere rationality basis review and expressly

reaffirmed an intermediate level of scrutiny. 92 The Edge Broadcasting
Court, however, failed to even mention the heightened level of judicial
scrutiny which Discovery Network required. Asserting instead that
the substantial interest prong of the Central Hudson test was met
because Congress enacted section 1307 to balance the competing

interests of lottery and nonlottery states. 93 The Court further inferred
that this interest was substantial because gambling implicates 94no

constitutionally protected right and can be prohibited altogether.
The Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates had similarly

reasoned that because over 50 jurisdictions prohibit gambling based
on their concerns for "the disruption of the moral and cultural
patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the
191. Two scholars, who authored a comprehensive examination of publicly
operated lotteries, observed:
Every state lottery law provides explicit safeguards against corruption ....
Not only do the laws provide for competitive bidding and financial reporting-requirements common to all public agencies-but they also pay special
attention to the uprightness of retailers and suppliers. Licenses are not
granted to anyone with connections to organized crime or illegal gambling.
Illinois explicitly warns against the use of the lottery 'as a cloak for the
carrying on of organized gambling and crime.' The lottery laws mandate
background checks of retailers and suppliers, and many also impose elaborate disclosure requirements on contractors.
CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 23, at 162-63 (footnotes omitted).
192. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13
(1993). The Court recently explained that such "rational basis" scrutiny is not to be
applied when deciding the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech:
[Wihile we have rejected the 'least-restrictive-means' test for judging restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis
review. A regulation need not be 'absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end,' but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome
alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between the ends and
means is reasonable.
Id. (citations omitted).
193. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2703; see also supra note 59.
194. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2703.
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development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime," 195

it was not difficult to conclude that the governmental interest was
substantial. 96 Applying that same reasoning, the fact that thirty-four
states now sponsor state lotteries and according to some estimates, by
the end of the decade all but two States (Utah and Nevada) will have

state-run lotteries, 97 suggests the opposite result for the substantial
interest prong. Only Justice Stevens, in his dissent, recognized this
analogy. 98
The Court's analysis of the third prong of the Central Hudson
test was also very questionable. The Court held that the lower courts
erred in holding sections 1304 and 1307 could be challenged as applied
to Edge under the third part of the Central Hudson test, whether the
restrictions directly advanced the asserted governmental interest. 199 In

this case, the Court stated "it [was] readily apparent that this question
cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental interest [was] directly advanced as applied to a single person

or entity,"0 instead, that issue was more properly analyzed under
the fourth factor of the Central Hudson test. 20 1

The Court reasoned that because the 127,000 residents in Edge's

nine-county listening area in North Carolina are shielded from hearing
lottery advertisements from Edge's radio station, the statutes directly

advanced North Carolina's interest in discouraging gambling. 20 2 Nevertheless, those listeners in North Carolina are anything but shielded
from lottery advertisements. The lower courts observed that the North
Carolina residents who might listen to Edge were "inundated" with

195. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986) (citation omitted).
196. Id.
197. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Justice Stevens stated:
But just as the fact that 'the vast majority of the 50 States ...

Id.

prohibit[ed]

casino gambling' purported to inform the Court's conclusion in [Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates], that Puerto Rico had a 'substantial' interest in
discouraging such gambling, the national trend in the opposite direction in
[Edge Broadcasting] surely undermines the United States' contention that
non-lottery States have a 'substantial' interest in discouraging their citizens
from traveling across state lines and participating in a neighboring State's
lottery.
199. Edge BroadcastingCo., 113 S. Ct. at 2704.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2706.
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Virginia-based media carrying lottery advertising. 20 3 The Court merely
disregarded this fact by reasoning that the substantial interest involved, which the courts below did not fully appreciate, was the
congressional balancing of the policies of lottery and nonlottery states,
and that was the interest which was directly advanced by applying
sections 1304 and 1307 to all radio stations located in North Carolina. 2°4 This reasoning, however, simply followed the initial misconasserted by the government and
struction of the substantial interest
25
analysis.
provided no substantive
Moreover, the Court specifically emphasized in Edenfield that a
"[governmental body] seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial
speech carries the burden of justifying it," 2°6 and must "demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will alleviate
them to a material degree." 20 7 The Court further stated that the
"burden [was] not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture. ' 20° To
rule otherwise, the Court observed, would allow a state to easily
restrict commercial speech under the guise of other objectives that
could not themselves justify a burden on commercial speech. 2°9
The government's burden was not mentioned anywhere in the
Court's third prong analysis in Edge Broadcasting.After demonstrating the importance of the governmental burden in Edenfield, it is
indeed strange that the Court did not cite to that decision for this
principle. Instead, the Court cited Edenfield in passing as merely
demonstrating that nothing in its decision suggested an individual
203. See Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1992).
The Fourth Circuit stated:
[Tlhe North Carolina residents which the statute purport to protect already
are exposed to numerous Virginia Lottery advertisements through telecast,
broadcast and print media. Prohibiting [Edge] from advertising Virginia's
lottery is ineffective in shielding North Carolina residents from lottery
information. This ineffective or remote measure to support North Carolina's
desire to discourage gambling cannot justify infringement upon commercial
free speech.
Id.
204. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2704. Basically the Court is holding
that, even though empirical evidence demonstrates that §§ 1304 and 1307 are
completely ineffective as applied to Edge, the statutes can still be applied to a class
of broadcast media.
205. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
206. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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could bring an "as applied" commercial challenge on the basis of the
individual's own conduct. 210 Thus, the Court was satisfied that the
statutes directly advanced the congressional balancing of different
policies between states because the statutes as applied to all radio
stations in North Carolina and other nonlottery states served to
decrease the amount of listeners who would be subjected to the lottery
ads.

21

1

The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, as refined by Fox,
requires that the "fit" between the restriction and the governmental
interest be reasonable. 2 2 The Court again utilized a mere deferential
basis review stating: "[wje have no doubt that the fit in this case was
a reasonable one. '2 3 To support this premise, the Court stated that
it was reasonable to require Edge to comply with sections 1304 and
1307 because to do otherwise would allow Virginia's lottery policies
214
to dictate what a radio station in an adjoining state may air.
However, the Court chose to ignore a critical distinction. This
case could have been decided on equal protection. The statutory
scheme obviously disrupted the free flow of truthful commercial
information about a legal activity within another state, an activity
which the citizens in North Carolina have every right to engage in
when they venture outside of North Carolina's protective borders. By
enacting this statutory scheme and exemption, Congress is impeding
the entry of a North Carolina business into Virginia borders, thus
providing the basis for an equal protection challenge. 21 5 Instead of
210. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. 2696, 2707 (1993).
This is indeed a strange new doctrine since from the earliest of decisions, the Court
has expressed a preference for "as applied" constitutional challenges rather than
facial challenges. Specifically, as early as 1885 the Court stated:
[l]n the exercise of [constitutional] jurisdiction, [this Court] is bound by
two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered: one, never to anticipate a question
of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other,
never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (emphasis
added).
211. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2706-07.
212. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
213. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
214. Id.
215. "Since only 1707o of [Edge's] advertisers live in North Carolina, its economic
existence hinges on its ability to attract Virginia advertisers. Sections 1304 and 1307
prevented [Edge] from carrying advertisements for Virginia businesses wishing to
advertise their affiliation with the Virginia lottery." Brief for the Respondent at *12,
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S.Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, S. Ct. Briefs file).
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refuting Edge's equal protection argument, the Court merely applied
the analysis utilized for First Amendment challenges.
21 6
Thus, the Court asserted that the Ward v. Rock Against Racism
holding was applicable to Edge Broadcasting because "[it] teaches
[the Court to] judge the validity of the restriction in this case by the
relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies
of both lottery and nonlottery States, not by the extent to which it
furthers the Government's interest in an individual case. ' 21 7 Nevertheless, nothing in any of the Court's prior decisions have expressly
suggested an individual cannot challenge a regulation as applied to
his or her own acts. For instance, the Court in Edenfield treated a
CPA's challenge to a ban on in-person solicitation, as applied. In
Edge Broadcasting, however, the Court cited Edenfield as support for
the opposite view, that the CPA's claim was an applied challenge to
a broad category of would-be solicitors, an assertion the Court made
with no analysis whatsoever.
The critical point, nevertheless, is that the Court stated an applied
challenge could not be made, but then went on to give a substantial
analysis as to why, even if it were to allow such a challenge, the
statutory restriction as applied to Edge directly advanced the govern21 If
mental interest within the meaning of the Central Hudson test.
the Court was indeed promulgating a new standard, that an individual
cannot challenge a commercial speech restriction as applied to an
individual's own acts or circumstances, then there was no judicial
benefit for the Court to have engaged in such a searching analysis.
The Court observed that in light of the facts relied on, the restrictions
were more than "ineffective," "remote," or "conditional, ' 21 9 and
offered more than only "limited incremental support ' 220 for the
antigambling policies of North Carolina. 221 Thus, the Court found the
increase in exposure of lottery advertisements to listeners in Edge's
service area in North Carolina not without significance.
The factual determination the Court engaged in was certainly
questionable, especially when the "significance" of the listeners exposed to lottery advertisements constituted only two percent of North

216.
217.
218.
219.

491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
Id. at 2708.
Id. at 2706 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).

220. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)).
221. Id.
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Carolina's total population. 222 The majority chose to ignore the empirical evidence, which demonstrated that virtually all North Carolina
residents living in Edge's service area were already exposed to lottery
advertising, and instead applied an expanded analysis towards what
constituted direct advancement of the government's interest. 223 This
expansion was neither called for by prior decision nor necessary to
the analysis. Certainly, the "as applied" challenge is now in a doubtful
position as to whether it can be utilized by challengers of restrictions
on commercial speech when the restriction adversely affects only a
single individual.
The Court also ignored its decision in Discovery Network which
reaffirmed that the proponent of a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of demonstrating a "reasonable fit" between the
asserted state interest and the means chosen to effectuate that interest. 224 While the "fit" between the means and ends may not necessarily
be perfect, it must be "in proportion to the interest served. ' 225 It can
hardly be argued that a categorical ban on truthful advertising regarding an activity in another state, which is perfectly legal, is in
proportion to effectuating the government's asserted interest in protecting the policies of nonlottery states. The fact that the content of
Virginia lottery advertisements is informational and not promotional
226
also severely undermines the need for a complete ban.
In addition, the ease in which the Court dismissed the force of
its holding in Bigelow v. Virginia227 is startling. The Bigelow Court
rejected the highly paternalistic approach by which the State of
Virginia had convicted a newspaper editor for printing advertisements
about abortions offered in an adjoining state. 22 The Court noted that
"[a State] may seek to disseminate information so as to enable its
own citizens to make better informed decisions when they leave. But
it may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar
a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an
activity that is legal in that State. ' 229 Although the facts are substan222.
Co., 113
223.
224.
225.
226.
Co., 113
227.
228.
229.

See Brief for the Respondent at *7, United States v. Edge Broadcasting
S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. Briefs file).
Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993).
Id. at n. 12 (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
See Brief for the Respondent at *10 n.6, United States v. Edge Broadcasting
S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. Briefs file).
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Id. at 811-12; see also supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824-25.
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tially similar, the majority in Edge Broadcasting failed to even distin-

guish Bigelow. 230 In short, the Court condoned a statute which empirical
evidence demonstrated had failed to achieve the desired objective,
discouraging gambling in nonlottery states. Moreover, the Court

tailored its analysis to reach a decision consistent with what they
believed to be a good result. The Court's conclusions in Edge Broad-

casting was no where in line with the need for individuals to make
well informed choices.
IV.

PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF UNITED STATES V. EDGE
BROADCASTING Co.

While Discovery Network and Edenfield seemed to indicate a
much more positive treatment towards commercial speech, Edge
Broadcasting definitely dealt a blow to First Amendment interests.

Essentially, Edge Broadcastingrepresents a set-back in three respects.

First, it provided little insight regarding how to apply the much
criticized decision of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates. Instead of
affirming or rejecting the dicta that the greater power to prohibit an
activity necessarily includes the lesser power to prohibit its advertisement, the Court in Edge Broadcasting simply chose not to address

the issue, although it easily could have on a factual basis.23 ' Accord-

ingly, the state of affairs for many economic forces, such as cigarettes,
alcohol, prescription and nonprescription drugs, health devices and
other products or activities, which are frequently regulated, are now
230. Justice Stevens in his dissent appropriately stated:
In seeking to assist nonlottery States in their efforts to shield their citizens
from the perceived dangers emanating from neighboring State's lottery, the
Federal Government has not regulated the content of such advertisements,
to ensure that they are not misleading, nor has it provided for the distribution
of more speech, such as warnings or educational information about gambling. Rather, the United States has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous, form of regulation possible-a ban on truthful information regarding
a lawful activity imposed for the purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citizens. Unless justified by a
truly substantial governmental interest, this extreme, and extremely paternalistic, measure surely cannot withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2710 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
231. Since both Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates and Edge Broadcasting
involved gambling, an activity which is not constitutionally protected and often
considered a "vice," one can only hope that the Court's citation to Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates was simply because of their factual similarities.
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left with only the slim hope that government will not place further
restrictions on advertisements for their products. What the decision
seems to suggest is that if there is simply a minimal "fit" between
the asserted state interest and the restriction, then the restriction will
be sustained. The holding should have advertisers of products which
are normally considered "vices" fearing additional government regulation.
Second, the Court's disregard for the principles established in
both Discovery Network and Edenfield is very disturbing. It was
almost as if the Court in Edge Broadcasting recognized that intermediate scrutiny was the protection accorded commercial speech in
these decisions, but chose to ignore it. Instead, the Court took a mere
rationality basis review and deferred to the legislature's judgment that
states require assistance in regulating advertising about lotteries, a
position which bore relevance in a different social and political era
but no longer is relevant to the modern state-run lotteries. 2 2 Accordingly, the Court's attempt to revive the mere rationality approach
utilized in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, instead of relying on
the intermediate scrutiny reaffirmed in Discovery Network and Edenfield, leaves both sides of the commercial speech debate able to rely
upon the precedent of judicial review which best suits their specific

needs .233

Finally, the Court's presumptive trump over the rights of citizens
to make informed choices is the most troubling aspect of Edge
Broadcasting. Citizens have a right to make informed choices about
decisions which are perfectly legal activities. What the Court encompasses in this decision is a sweeping ban on information that is
truthful and does not propose an illegal activity in the adjoining state
of Virginia. Nevertheless, the reasoning utilized by this Court, coupled
with its departure from the principles established in Discovery Network and Edenfield, suggests that this decision may be limited to the
unique factual circumstances in Edge Broadcasting.For instance, even
the dissenting Justice Stevens noted in a footnote that he shared
232. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
233. For instance, groups advocating restrictions on commercial speech would
argue that "the greater power to completely ban [an activity] necessarily includes the
lesser power to ban advertising of [that activity]," thus requiring only a "minimal
fit" between the restriction and the asserted interest. See supra note 88. Those
opposed would argue that the government carries the burden of demonstrating a
"reasonable fit" between the asserted interest and the means chosen to serve that
interest. See supra note 103. Both arguments represent different levels of judicial
review but purportedly address the validity of restrictions on commercial speech.
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234
concerns that state-sponsored lotteries prey upon the lower class.
Strong personal convictions about gambling and lotteries might have
led the Court to make this strong departure from its previous decisions. Such rationale, however, is not an adequate justification for
the sweeping decision which the Court embraced.
As a final note, Justice White, who authored the majority opinion
in Edge Broadcasting, has been replaced by Justice Ginsberg, providing some hope that the damage caused by this decision will be limited.
Commercial speech is here to stay, and it is about time it was accorded
the protection which is necessary for a well informed society.
CONCLUSION

While the two commercial speech decisions decided earlier during
the 1993 Supreme Court Term had commercial speech followers
breathing a sigh of relief, the decision that followed knocked the wind
right out of them. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 235 and
Edenfield v. Fane 236 both reaffirmed and expanded the First Amendment protection accorded commercial speech. United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co. ,237 however, left the level of judicial protection
accorded commercial speech in a state of confusion. Essentially, there
are two different lines of commercial speech decisions, one embracing
a mere rationality review, and the other an intermediate standard of
review.
The Edge Broadcasting Court purportedly applied an intermediate
standard of review, but in reality merely deferred to the legislature's
judgment that the federal lottery advertising statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§
1304 and 1307, as well as the corresponding FCC regulations, were
necessary. The Court based its decision on outdated notions that
lotteries promote social instability, fraud, and corruption. The Court
ignored the fact that modern-day technology largely alleviates the
problems often associated with the early nineteenth century lotteries.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the statutes directly advanced the
asserted state interest "as applied" to a class of would-be broadcasters, and nothing in their prior decisions suggested an individual could
challenge a commercial speech restriction "as applied" to his or her
own conduct. Justice White's dicta has no basis in the long line of
commercial speech decisions which have expressed preference for "as
applied" rather than facial challenges.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Edge BroadcastingCo., 113 S. Ct. at 2710 n.5.
113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
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The federal lottery advertising statutes as they stand today are
simply not appropriate to deal with the situations encountered in our
technological society. The unique facts in Edge Broadcastingpresented
a strong argument for equal protection. The Court chose not to
address this issue, however, and instead applied an expanded analysis
as to what constituted direct advancement of the governmental interest. The Court manipulated the empirical evidence which demonstrated that the antilottery scheme was ineffective as applied to North
Carolina residents within Edge's listening area since those residents
were already "inundated" with lottery advertisements from Virginia
television and newsprint media.
Further, the Supreme Court abandoned the consistency of stare
decisis when it disregarded the important principles established in
Discovery Network and Edenfield. The Court simply tailored its
analysis to reach a result they felt was consistent with the federalism
interest in protecting states with different policies. The Court's paternalistic approach in upholding a complete ban on truthful advertising
regarding a legal activity, was in no way proportionate to the asserted
interest in protecting nonlottery states' antigambling policies. These
outdated government policies, which at one time served an important
interest, no longer substantiate a complete ban on the free flow of
truthful commercial information.
TARA L. LAVERY

